Precursors to Social Theory & Rousseau
This class catches us up on the Enlightenment, then on to the basic issues raised by Rousseau (JR) in his work on the social contract.
I. Review intro
a. Problems of order, action & identity
b. Scientific sociology
II. Background: The Idea of Society
a. Three features needed to make social theory possible:
i. A separation of “society” from “government”
ii. What happened in society was valuable in itself – this was also a turn toward secular issues – that we care about how living life matters, how people live, eat, earn, etc. This similarly involved a move toward thinking about government as responsible to the needs and wants of publics (rather than divine right of kings, say), making just revolutions possible and building the foundations for democracy.
iii. Had to conceptualize “the people” as a collective with boundaries. This gave rise to notions of the Nation. As Rousseau pointed out, the will of the people was somehow more basic than just their individual wants and needs.
b. Enlightenment & Science
i. This period sees a dramatic rise in the role of reason and evidence in human understanding, including our understanding of ourselves. This was yet a further step away from religious traditionalism.
ii. Key ideas for enlightenment included:
1. Role of science
2. Exercise of individual reason
3. tolerance for difference
4. equality of rights
iii. Technology like printing presses clearly made the spread of literacy and reason more likely.
iv. Individual rights were grounded in the idea that all could reason, and thus had a right/obligation to do so, and thus should be seen as equals. Note that this had a funny relation with our understanding of “others” like women, minorities, foreigners, etc.
c. Quick summary of other authors
i. Kant – (1724-1804)
1. Enormously influential philosopher. Key works include critique of pure reason, critique of practical reason, Critique of Judgment, works on ethics, epistemology, aesthetics: key theme was developing a universal approach to these issues, that would not vary across cultures but was rooted in the very basis of being human.
2. A founder of idealism, claimed that all of our ideas are rooted in human reason. Argued that moral life was based on free will – choice not force.
3. pioneered the idea of “critique” – seeking to contrast apparent and actual knowledge. The key was to distinguish “belief and habit” from knowledge, by pushing it with questions. This is something we strive for in our own work.
4. his notions of pure absolute truth have been critiqued by many modern thinkers, as it is very easy for such ideas to slip into absolutism that can limit freedom. It’s still an open debate, for example, as to how we understand “truth” as a concept.
ii. Smith – (1723 – 1790)
1. Key
figure in Scottish enlightenment (also includes Hume,
2. Wrote on moral philosophy, focusing on the notion that people had positive human sentiments.
3. Wealth of Nations (1776) is most famous book. Pioneered the idea that markets created order and produced collective benefit even if the motivations were selfish: markets were self regulating.
a. This is a key idea about levels of inquiry: market outcomes are emergent properties and this is of key interest to sociologists.
b. Smith argued that markets depended on equality of access – so no large corporate control, say.
iii. Tocqueville – (1805-1859)
1. Most famous for Democracy in America, and the notion that the social organization of civil life was key to a functional democracy. Coined the term “individualism” noted many interesting trends that seem true today too. A fun read, if you have time!
iv. Hobbes – (1588-1679)
1. Most relevant book is Leviathan, perhaps the first of the “social contract” theorists. He argued that the sovergnty of the king was a natural result from our handing authority over to avoid a “ware of all against all.” One of the most influential theorists of law, often contrasted w. Rousseau because he doesn’t see free natural life as good. Instead he sees it as “nasty, brutish and short” – a setting where only the strong rule.
v. Locke – (1632 – 1704)
1. Most relevant work is the second treatise of government. Notion of a “state of nature” that contrasts with Hobbes. He sees this as a state of equality, and based on our construction by God, we have a right to exist. From this follows directly rights to self, liberty, property. These were central to the founding father’s view. Both Hobbes and Locke differ from later enlightenment theorists in the role they give to God vs. Reason.
III. Rousseau: Of the Social Contract
a. Biography.
i. Lived 1712 to 1778.
ii.
Born in
b. Key themes
i. Nature: we need to be close to nature to be happy & fulfilled. Science and progress often create alienation by taking us from that source.
ii. “General Will” vs. “Will of All” – will of all is just average opinion, general will is more basic, but difficult to measure. It’s related to what is good for all of us, and we have the capacity to see it.
iii. Key writer in the notion of Freedom & equality.
c.
Of The Social
Contract
“Man is born free; and everywhere
he is in chains.” (p.28)
“…the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions.”
Note the absence of god here,
which would in earlier times have been a third alternative (nature, god, convention).
i. The First Societies
Families are the best first model of governments. Father : Ruler :: Children : citizens
Spends a bit of time (p.29) discrediting Hobbes and Grotius – both influential earlier writers who argued for the legitimacy of the monarch. This is variously due to ideas that people are of different sorts naturally (ruler, ruled), or dupes of force (slaves).
The notion of slavery is complex, and the treatment here is too fast. I’d not read too much into his use of “…and cowardice perpetuated the condition.” (p.29). My sense of the larger work is that he’s making the claim than nobody is naturally a slave – only made so by conditions.
Note the rejection of God – he’s just uninterested.
ii. The Right of the Strongest
“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, obedience into duty.” (p.29)
The argument against is a reduction to absurdity – that “right” can’t mean anything more than “force” in this construction, and obedience does not imply an “ought” other than prudence, and thus the right is fleeting.
“Let us then admit that force does not create right, and we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers.” (p.30)
This theme comes up often in future work on power & legitimacy, particularly in Weber and Arendt.
So, does might make right?
Rousseau says no, but how might we know this? Is it true de facto?
iii. Slavery
It is important to note here that
the sorts of slavery JR is referring to are broader than antebellum slaver in
the
Alienate: to give or to sell. Slaves are alienated in this light in the sense that they work for survival (else they die).
Can a people – a political body – alienate itself? JR says no, because the king is getting his survival from the people, not the other way round. [is this true? What of wars & such?] He argues that it would make no sense to “give oneself” for nothing, and thus a society of such people would be a society of madmen. (p.30)
He also take a shot at the ‘one time’ nature of “state of nature” arguments, arguing that children can’t be promised, and thus the government would need refreshed at each generation. If this were done, it would not look like any monarchy we know. (p.31)
JR argues that the very notion of war presupposes a state and state interests (laws etc.). Else you have only duel and combats, and certainly no way to extend this situation to personal obligation.
Note the important role relations play here (p.31) and the claim that relations can only exist between equal units (state with state, rather than state with person). Is this true? What of company with customer? What relation do citizens have with their country?
Note the discussion of war as being only legitimate when between states. What does this say of revolutions? When would they be just? What of something like the “war on terror”?
Since war does not give a state the right to individual property and stuff – it does not give the right to massacre individuals – then it cannot give the right to enslave either (p.32). How does this square with our historical understanding of slavery?
“The words slave and right contradict each other, and are mutually exclusive.” (p.32)
iv. Going back to first convention
Mass society: forcing rule would not be a society.
“Even if scattered individuals were successfully enslaved by one man, …, I still see no more than a master and his slaves, and certainly not a people and their ruler; I see what may be termed an aggregation, not an association; there is as yet neither public good nor body politic.” (p.32)
Key aspect of a society is a public good and an association “a body politic”
“It would be better, …, to examine that by which it [society] has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.” (p.33)
We need an understanding of the social compact; the instance of decision making that allows for things like majority rule. (p.33).
This is a key question for sociology: how do we define a collective? How does that collective create rights? What are the foundations for rights (if not in agreement)? What role does a minority have relative to a majority?
v. Social Compact
If we need a moment, what are we looking for? He imagines that there is some moment in time when people can’t just do it themselves. They need to combine forces, but how to do this without giving up freedom?
“The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” (p.33)
The social contract makes this possible.
Says this is common everywhere, even if not explicit. A key point (bottom of p.33) is that as soon as the compact is broken, people can immediately revert to their own liberty – so personal liberty (individualism) trumps the association.
The key form of the contract is:
“the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.” (p.33)
This means that we have (a) equality, (b) complete association (p.34), and since each gives up everything, “in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody” and gains an equivalent position with everyone.
The model is one of “all for all” – a world without hierarchy. This give rise to his overall statement about the social compact:
“Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and , in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”
The general will becomes the key element for Rousseau, it’s the guiding thing that drives the rest of the system.
General will is what the body politic (community of citizens) would
unanimously do if they were selecting general laws and were choosing/voting
with full information, good reasoning, unclouded judgment (bias and emotion can
cloud judgment), public spirit, and attempting to discern the common good. (wikipedia entry)
The general will is “…a rational unity among all men, consisting of what their reason would desire if all individual passions and desires could be stilled” (p.xvi in Grocker’s 1967 edition)
vi. Sovereign
Once formed, the state creates a set of obligations, and this is self-reinforcing. “duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties [individual and state] to give each other help; (p.35)
The view is very positive: in the ideal, where the general will is real and working: “The Sovereign, merely by virture of what it is, is always what it should be.” (p.35)
Note this is not true for individuals vis a vis the state.
“Each individual… may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as citizen.” (p.35) (note that this assumes two interests: one as individual, a second as citizen).
“In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking,…,that whoever refuses to obe the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence [i.e. despots]” (p.35).
vii. Civil State
The movement from state of nature to citizen brings with it a move from individual inclination to duty based on reason. This is good, JR thinks. Ennobling the spirit, exercising reason, etc. But for the abuses this condition sometimes holds (p.36).
That is, I think JR is strongly critiquing the real against the actual here, though quickly and subtly. The ideal civil state would be one of bliss and perfection, though the actual one is filled with abuses that degrade him.
The tradeoff is given clearly:
“What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to avoid mistake in weighting one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title.” (p.36)
We move from “mere impulse of appetite” which is equated to slavery to “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves” which is “real liberty” (p.36).
So in the state of nature, we have what we can take, and can keep it as long as we’re strong enough to stop somebody else from getting it. In the civil state, we have rights empowered by the general will, that give us property and civil liberty (i.e. duty and obligation).
Is this right? Or has JR specified a system that can’t help but turn to totalitarian?
viii. Real Property
First paragraph here essentially says that the world of relations between states is effectively one of force and similar to the SON.
He’s really casting doubt on the ability to lay claim to property by just being there. You have to use it in some real sense, and it must be linked to an association as well (if you’re to have valid title). The right of first occupancy is weak, and only valid when combined with necessary labor. Still, the ultimate right rests in the state:
“However the acquisition be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real force in the exercise of sovereignty.” (p.37)
The key advantage, he notes in closing, is that this arrangement builds equality of right in place of natural inequality, though he notes in the footnote (5) that this is rarely true when real physical inequality is too large.
IV. Extensions
a. Social contract views
i. The social contract is a theory solution to the problem of order: out of a state of nature, there comes an agreement that gives rise to stable legal systems and hence order. But we know these are not historically true, so are they useful? How?
ii. What is the foundation of political rights? Do they ultimately rest on force? Are there real international rights, and if so, based on what feature of human social organization? How would we contest a right?
b. How much order is there?
i. Think of current problems – are these breakdowns in order? Or are they examples of competing social forces?